We analyze the market assessment of sovereign credit risk in an emerging market using a reduced-form model to price the credit default swap (CDS) spreads thus enabling us to derive values for the probability of default (PD) and loss given default (LGD) from the quotes of sovereign CDS contracts. We compare different specifications of the models allowing for both fixed and time varying LGD, and we use these values to analyze the sovereign credit risk of Polish debt throughout the recent global financial crisis. Our results suggest the presence of a low LGD and a relatively high PD for Poland during the crisis. The highest PD is in the months following the collapse of Lehman Brothers. The derived measures of sovereign risk are strongly linked with the level of public debt and with another measure of PD from a structural model. Correlations between our PD values and the CDS spreads heavily depend on the maturity of the sovereign CDS. JEL Classification: C11, C32, G01, G12, G15 Keywords: sovereign credit risk, CDS spreads, probability of default, loss given default, Poland ECB Working Paper 1924, June 2016 1 maturities are strongly driven by changes in the short-term PDs, while for longer maturities, changes in CDS spreads are more closely associated with the developments in LGDs. This fact is important because the CDS spreads for Polish sovereign debt have been less volatile during the crisis than the spreads of several other developed and emerging markets in Europe.
NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
We study market perceptions of sovereign credit risk in Poland during the recent global financial crisis. Poland is an interesting market to consider because it is a relatively large economy in Central and Eastern Europe that was successfully transformed from a centrally planned economy to a market-based economy. Poland did not suffer from the macroeconomic and financial imbalances that characterized many emerging and developed economies in the years before the global financial crisis. Its markets were nonetheless affected, first by the global financial turbulences which were brought by the collapse of Lehmann Brothers in September 2008, and second, by the sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone in the years 2011-2012. This suggests that the case of Poland may serve as a natural laboratory for studying the transmission of risk from developed markets to a local emerging market. In this context, it is worth recalling that Poland was also the only European economy which recorded positive GDP growth throughout this recent crisis.
In our empirical analysis, we use credit default swaps to evaluate market perception of sovereign credit risk at different time horizons. The pricing formula for CDS spreads allows disentangling the probability of default (PD) from the loss given default (LGD) associated with holding debt over a certain time horizon. Indeed, we are not only interested in studying the time-varying estimates of sovereign credit risk, e.g. the level of the PD curve, but also the projections of this risk at different horizons, i.e. the slope of the PD curve. While separate identification of PD and LGD remains empirically challenging, it is in principle valuable information for early warning models of financial crises and other methods to predict financial defaults. We estimate two main types of models. First, models which assume that the LGD is constant in time and across maturities while the PD is allowed to change in time and across maturities. Second, models where both LGD and PD are allowed to change in time and across maturities.
In our empirical analysis, we find that market participants did not envisage large potential losses in the event of a default on Polish sovereign debt. Our LGD estimates for Poland did not exceed 5% and did not display large fluctuations during the crisis years of 2008-2012. The probabilities of default, however, reacted strongly to the unfolding of the subprime crisis in the US and to the failure of Lehman Brothers. When looking at the term structure of the CDS spreads, it transpires that movements of the original CDS over short ECB Working Paper 1924, June 2016
Introduction
A thorough evaluation of sovereign credit risk is an important element in the decision making process of international investors. Sovereign credit risk is commonly used as a measure of the resilience of a country against economic shocks. Furthermore, a deterioration of the sovereign credit risk spreads quickly to the premia demanded for holding locally traded financial instruments and equally hampers liquidity conditions in domestic markets. The market assessment of sovereign credit risk is also crucial for central governments, as the price of sovereign debt and the ability to raise funds from private investors depends heavily upon it.
In this paper we analyze the sovereign credit risk of an emerging market, Poland, by means of recently proposed econometric techniques. There are a number of studies that analyze the main drivers underlying the development of CDS spreads in the emerging markets of Central and Eastern Europe. Most of these studies focused primarily on financial spillovers and contagion across countries and found evidence of contagion effects within Central and Eastern European countries from outside of the region, especially during the global financial crisis. (Kisgergely, 2009; Kliber, 2011; Adam, 2013; Beirne and Fratzscher, 2013) . Some of these early studies also found that sovereign rating announcements had a significant impact on CDS spreads, as was especially the case after the collapse of Lehman Brothers (Ismailescu and Kazemi, 2010; Afonso et al., 2012) .
However, in contrast with the economic literature for developed economies and non-Central and Eastern European emerging economies, most of these studies used the CDS spreads and did not attempt to estimate the values two main dimensions of the credit risk in financial modeling -the probability of default (PD) and the loss given default (LGD). Using information from sovereign CDS spreads, a market's perception of the PD of a country and the loss incurred should that country default (i.e., the LGD) could both be inferred. However, and while feasible from a theoretical perspective, a separate identification of the PD and LGD remains empirically challenging (cf. Pan and Singleton, 2008) . This has prompted researchers to adopt the assumption of a constant LGD value over the sample. This strategy was regarded as satisfactory for many years but has now become more open to criticism. A fixed LGD is at odds with empirical observations of historical sovereign defaults and historical spreads that suggest the LGD varies with time (Trebesch et al., 2012 ). An obvious explanation for a time varying LGD is that both the default rate and the LGD are strongly influenced by the business cycle. The same adverse economic conditions that cause defaults to rise -such as a recession -can cause recoveries to fail. Recent episodes of debt restructuring may also suggest that the ECB Working Paper 1924, June 2016 structure of the debt (i.e., its maturity, type of holder, and currency profiles) may have an impact on both the PD and LGD. This impact may or may not be as evident on the PD and
LGD as the impact of the business cycle. Furthermore, a time varying LGD is also aligned with the current reporting of `recovery ratings' for sovereigns by rating agencies. For example, Standard & Poor's first started providing recovery ratings for non-investment grade sovereigns in 2007.
A notable exception in the literature is Gapen et al. (2008) , who applied a contingent claim analysis to study twelve emerging markets, including Poland. They then compared the implied risk of default measures of each country with quotations of sovereign CDS spreads.
The authors found a strong correlation between their measure of sovereign risk and other market based measures, including sovereign CDS spreads and PD values derived from a sovereign CDS. They did, however, assume that the LGD remained constant throughout the entire sample. Another notable exception was Plank (2010) who employed a structural economic model to derive the PD of six emerging countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Russia, Romania, and Turkey). Their measure hinged on the country's access to external capital flows and its ability to repay external debt. The PD estimated from the economic model was then used to price sovereign CDS contracts. Once more, the LGD was fixed over the course of the sample and assigned the value commonly adopted when dealing with emerging markets (i.e., 75%). Finally, Konopczak (2014) built another structural model to estimate the PD for Poland. This author used detailed information on the term-structure of Polish debt and the Black-Scholes formula to derive a measure of sovereign risk.
The scarce number of similar empirical works on credit risk assessment for emerging markets and in particular for Central European economies motivated us to focus on this region. Taking into account the leading economies of this region, the so called Central European Three ("CE3") countries of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, the credit risk for Poland was historically developing nearest the average risk of these countries (cf. Moreover, the use of sovereign CDS spreads allows to escape some liquidity problems inherent in sovereign bond yields. According to Longstaff et. al. (2011) , the key advantage of sovereign CDS data is that the sovereign CDS market is usually more liquid than the corresponding sovereign bond market. This leads to more accurate measurements of credit risk with the use of sovereign CDS spreads than with sovereign bond yield spreads. Besides, Fontana and Scheicher (2010) argue that movements in sovereign bond yield spreads during the financial crisis also reflected liquidity distortions during recent financial crisis (see e.g. Fontana and Scheicher, 2010) . Coming back to the credit swap market in Poland, we should note that the gross notional weekly volume of the market in Poland is larger than in many other countries of emerging Europe according to the Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation data. Namely, CDS market in Poland is more liquid than the corresponding market in the Czech Republic, Croatia, Bulgaria, Latvia, Slovenia, Lithuania, Cyprus and Estonia. Furthermore, a recent work by the IMF (2013) suggests the sovereign CDS market in Poland adjusted faster to new information than sovereign bond market. At the same time the sovereign CDS bid-ask spread for Poland was relatively low (less than for many developed and emerging countries), reflecting thus more liquidity in the market.
Poland is an interesting market to consider because it is a relatively large economy in Central and Eastern Europe that was successfully transformed from a centrally planned economy to a market-based economy. Poland did not suffer from the macroeconomic and financial imbalances that characterized many emerging and developed economies in the years before the global financial crisis. Nevertheless, its markets were still affected by the global financial turbulence brought by the collapse of Lehmann Brothers in September 2008 and also by the sovereign debt crisis in the eurozone throughout the years 2011-2012. This suggests that Poland may serve as a natural laboratory for studying the transmission of risk to a local emerging market and also to analyze the market assessment of sovereign risk. In this context, it is worth recalling that Poland was also the only European economy that recorded positive GDP growth throughout these recent crises.
While separate identification of the PD and LGD remains empirically challenging, it is in principle a valuable piece of information that functions as an early warning for financial crises and other values that predict financial defaults. In line with some of the recent literature, we use models that allow separate identification of the PD and the LGD embedded In contrast with the studies for Central and Eastern European economies, our contribution to the literature rests on estimating the time varying PD and LGD simultaneously using the term structure of sovereign credit default swap (CDS) contracts for Poland. We confirm that both PD and LGD can be identified quite precisely for the Polish sovereign CDS even during turbulent periods. This result opens up a new promising avenue for the joint estimation of time-varying PDs and LGDs of emerging markets with the use of reduced-form asset-pricing models. We also extend the literature on the reduced-form models of sovereign risk by comparing estimates of PDs generated by the model where only the PD is identified and the LGD is assumed known with estimates from the model allowing both PD and LGD to be identified simultaneously. We discuss differences between the CDS spreads and the PDs generated by the respective models.
We use information contained in the term structure of CDSs to evaluate the market perception of sovereign credit risk at different time horizons. The pricing formula for CDS spreads allows us to disentangle the PD from the LGD associated with holding debt over a certain time horizon. Indeed, we are not only interested in studying the time varying estimates of sovereign credit risk (e.g., the level of the PD curve) but also the projections of this risk at different horizons (i.e., the slope of the PD curve).
Our empirical analysis found that market participants did not envisage large potential losses in the event of a default on Polish sovereign debt. Our PD estimates for Poland reacted strongly to the unfolding of the subprime crisis in the U.S. and to the failure of Lehman Brothers. When looking at the term structure of the CDS spreads, we see that movements of the original CDS over short maturities are strongly driven by changes in the short-term PD values. By contrast, movements of the original CDS over longer maturities are more closely associated with developments in the LGD values, which however, did not exceed 5% and did not display large fluctuations during the crisis years of 2008-2012. This fact is important because the CDS spreads for Polish sovereign debt have been less volatile during the crisis than the spreads of several other developed and emerging markets within Europe. This suggests that at the peak of tensions, investors were likely not seriously concerned about the solvency of the Polish government (i.e., the LGD remained low), but more concerned about their ability to find enough liquidity to honor their payments in times of turmoil (i.e., the PD went up).
Our measures of sovereign credit risk are correlated with the level of sovereign debt and with another measure of risk derived from an alternative structural pricing model estimated by Konopczak (2014) . Correlation of the PD and LGD with the CDS spreads is also positive but heavily depends on the maturity of the sovereign CDS. These results suggest that market expectations regarding sovereign risk follow dynamic developments in economic fundamentals.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of studies related to analyses of sovereign CDS contracts for emerging markets in Central and Eastern Europe, and related methods to identify the PD and LGD from market CDS spreads are discussed here. Section 3 describes our method to estimate the model-implied PD and
LGD values. Section 4 discusses the empirical results and the final section presents the conclusions that can be drawn.
Pricing sovereign CDS spreads
In this section we have described the model used to price the risk of a sovereign default. This model has been used to derive the PD and LGD from the CDS spreads quoted on the market. The main element of our model is the pricing formula of sovereign CDS spreads.
A sovereign credit default swap is a financial contract developed to compensate investors in the event of a sovereign default. In financial terminology, such an event is called a credit event.
A credit event is the focal point within the terms of the CDS contract and is defined as a sudden and significant destructive change in a borrower's creditworthiness, often accompanied by deterioration of their credit rating. The list of typical events included in a sovereign CDS contract include failure to pay, obligation acceleration, repudiation/moratorium, or debt restructuring. The sovereign credit event does not embrace default, as there is no operable international court that applies to sovereign issuers (Pan and Singleton, 2008, p. 2348).
The two parties of a CDS contract are the protection buyer and the protection seller.
The protection buyer pays a premium to the protection seller each quarter up to the termination date of the CDS contract. The expected value of the discounted payments is approximated by the following expression (O'Kane and Turnbull, 2003):
where is the annualized premium (spread) paid by the protection buyer, is the number of contractual payment dates until the contract matures, 1 (⋅) is an indicator function equal to one when its argument is true and zero otherwise, and is the time of the credit event (default). If the credit event occurs during the interval ( + − 1, + ), the protection seller makes a payment, the LGD. If the credit event does not occur the protection seller makes no payment at all. The expected value of the payment equals:
where is the number of periods until termination of the CDS contract. The no-arbitrage condition assumes that = . Therefore, the value of the spread may be written as follows:
The expression �1 ( > + ) � denotes the survival probability of the obligor until time + , and � + � is the expected LGD at time + . We model both expressions using the homogenous Poisson processes with time varying intensity parameters. The intensity parameters are defined as the quadratic functions of exogenous factors and to ensure that the PD and LGD remain between zero and one:
The PD between time and + is defined as one minus the survival probability, + = 1 − �1 ( > + ) �. We further assume that both factors and follow an autoregressive process:
where the error terms are normally distributed as follows:
We can deduce from equations (3), (4), and (5) that the spread is a function of the factors and . The fit of the pricing model is never perfect and so we can write the pricing equation as:
where we express the spread in log terms, = log( ), to account for the large volatility of this variable, especially during financial crises. The expression ( , ) is also a logarithm of formula (3).
Our identification and estimation approach relies on the whole term structure of CDS spreads. Therefore, we employ ten CDS contracts with maturities between one year and ten years. Thus, the same factors and enter into equation (7) to fit ten CDS contracts with different maturities: Our final model takes the following form: � is the matrix of autoregressive coefficients. We assume that the vector of pricing errors is normally distributed, ~( , ). The errors are linearly independent, they all have the same finite variance ;, and is the identity matrix.
The procedure to derive the PD and LGD from quotes of financial instruments for each period and all maturities is as follows. When all parameters in model (9) For the sake of comparison and a robustness check, we investigate three specifications of our model. The first specification is the most general model with the time varying PD and time varying LGD, described by formula (9) . We call this specification the TVLGD model.
The second specification also uses the time varying PD; however, the LGD is assumed to be constant over time and its value is estimated along with other parameters in the model. We call this specification the CONSTLGD model. The third specification of the model is the same as the second, yet the constant LGD is not estimated and is instead fixed at some specific level known by market participants. We call this specification the FIXEDLGD model. Both the second and the third specifications imply that the equation explaining is excluded from the formula (6) and the is fixed (or estimated) at some level (e.g., * ).
Empirical results

Data
We use euro-denominated CDS contracts on Polish sovereign debt from Thomson
Reuters. In particular, we employ end-of-month observations from January 2004 to January 2014 for ten contracts with maturities ranging from one to ten years. Missing observations, both across time and across maturities, have been linearly interpolated from adjacent observations. It would be more intuitive to use USD-denominated quotations while comparing sovereigns from different regions, nonetheless, as we said in the beginning, the focus of this research generally lies on Central European emerging markets, where the euro exchange rate fluctuations affects an economy significantly. This in turn is justified by a large foreign trade with the Eurozone countries and future transition of these economies to European currency.
Therefore, the assessment of default in euro seems to be reasonable in case of Poland. 1 The liquidity of the sovereign euro CDS contracts for Poland is not high in absolute terms, and therefore, and in so far as our modelling strategy does not reflect on this, our empirical results may be partly affected by liquidity premia. On a more positive tone, euro CDS contracts for Poland are among the most frequently traded in the region relative to other CEE sovereigns. The bid-ask spreads are also relatively low, and importantly, they were not directly affected by the European Commission ban on naked sovereign CDS contracts.
The risk-free interest rates used to compute the discount factors in the pricing formula of the CDS contracts have been taken from the eurozone yield curve provided by the European Central Bank.
Parameter estimation results
Estimation results are presented in Table 1 . The FIXEDLGD model has been estimated setting the parameter * at three alternative values: 0.25, 0.50, and 0.75. The first and the third values are commonly chosen by market practitioners when modelling CDS spreads for either emerging markets ( * = 0.75), or developed markets ( * = 0.25).
We choose to further estimate a model with a fixed LGD of 0.50 because this is approximately the average loss rate observed in historical sovereign defaults (cf. Moody's Investors Service, 2011; Cruces and Trebesch, 2013).
The parameters governing the dynamics of the unobservable factor are very similar across all of the models. The parameter is close to zero and is close to one for all models, and the data generating process of resembles a random walk. The same applies to the data generating process for in the TVLGD model. The best estimation results, in terms of 2 , correspond to the TVLGD model. This is to be expected, as the other models are restricted versions of the TVLGD model. Interestingly, the CONSTLGD model performs much better than the FIXEDLGD model. However, considering that the estimated value of the LGD according to our CONSTLGD model is 0.05, well below the value of 0.75 that is commonly adopted when modeling emerging markets, this is not longer that surprising.
Interestingly, 0.05 is approximately the average value of the LGD estimate in the TVLGD model over the entire sample.
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
3.3.Separate identification of PD and LGD
We have attempted to determine whether the Polish PD and LGD can be satisfactorily identified. This assessment has been conducted by means of the graphical analysis employed by Christensen (2007) . Figure 2 shows that the CDS spreads react very differently (over different maturities) to changes in both the PD and LGD. Only one PD and LGD combination pair provides a perfect fit for all observed CDS spreads, suggesting that a separate identification of both the PD and LGD is feasible. This is most clearly shown in the chart for March 2013 when the PD was well below 90%.
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Despite all of this, it should be noted that the model-implied CDS spreads do not fit the observed spreads perfectly without any error. Thus, when assessing the identifiability of the parameters, it is sensible to report combinations of the PD and LGD that provide modelimplied CDS spreads not departing from the true values by more than the average absolute estimation error (Christensen, 2007) . Such combinations are shown in Figure 3 . Interestingly, the possible set of combinations of PD and LGD pairs that fit the CDS spreads within that margin of error is very narrow. Therefore, it is not surprising that the mean absolute value of the errors is relatively small (around 4.5 basis points). We thus check for identifiability under more rigorous conditions.
[Insert Figure 3 here]
We also examine the combination of the PD and LGD measures within a larger margin of error. In particular, we examine the largest average absolute error across maturities on the four chosen dates at times of major market turmoil (i.e., around 11 basis points in our estimation results). This is shown in Figure 3 in the darker colored area. The area of plausible combinations is understandably wider; however, even for that wide margin of error, plausible combinations remained contained for three of the dates plotted in Figure 3 thus suggesting great estimation results with relatively small estimation errors to satisfactorily separate the PD from the LGD. The contour plot shown in Figure 3 for the date June 2010 appears at first sight less than satisfactory. However, the domain over which the LGD is allowed to change remains relatively narrow, ranging from 1.0% to 2.5%.
PD and LGD estimates
The estimation results shown above suggest that the TVLGD better captures the dynamics of CDS spreads and that constraining the value of the LGD is not statistically justified. Furthermore, the standard value adopted by market practitioners to fix the value of
LGD when modelling the CDS of emerging economies (0.75) is not a reasonable modelling assumption in the case of Poland. The identification analysis shown above further suggests that a separate identification of PD and LGD is empirically tractable for Poland. Therefore, in what follows we will focus our analysis primarily on the TVLGD model, although references to the CONSTLGD model will remain for comparison.
The term structure of the PDs and LGDs over the sample period is shown in Figures 4 and 5 respectively. It appears that the slope of the LGD curve has been rather flat for most of the sample. Only when the crisis in the eurozone erupted was the slope of the LGD curve slightly more pronounced. This is in contrast with the slope of the PD curve. The uncertainty related to future periods increases the market assessment of risk and, when judged by the slope of the curve, it appears to have a larger effect on the PD than on the LGD. Figure 6 . We present results from the two-year contracts for the sake of parsimony and clarity. The standard horizon for predictions made with early warning models is also 24 months because the current economic fundamentals still have some effect on the risk of future crises in such a short horizon. We can see that the TVLGD model displays higher PD than the CONSTLGD model for much of the sample. This relationship becomes intuitive when the PDs are compared with the corresponding LGDs presented in Figure 7 . The time-varying
LGD generated by the TVLGD model remains below the constant LGD in the CONSTLGD model for most of the sample.
The highest risk of a sovereign default was recorded toward the end of 2008 and early 2009 following the collapse of Lehman Brothers. The PD for the two-year maturity reached values close to 90%. 2 At that time, and amid increased outflows of speculative capital, the Polish currency also depreciated by more than 30% against the euro and other major currencies. The inter-bank market was frozen and the stock market recorded record losses.
The slowdown of the global economy must have also contributed to the increase in PD. The
LGD also increased following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, but the recorded increases in
LGD were always contained and the LGD never exceeded 5%. The second sharp increase of PD took place at the end of 2011, and was associated with the financial turmoil in Greece and, in particular, the discussions associated with the Greek debt restructuring. This effect is equally noticeable in the estimates of LGD, which increased steadily throughout 2011 and reached their peak in mid-2012. However, once more the level of the LGD was quite low.
In this context, it is worth recalling that Poland did not suffer from the macroeconomic and financial imbalances that characterized many emerging and developed economies in the years that preceded the global financial crisis. The muted impact on the LGD in the Polish sovereign debt market at the peak of tensions suggests that investors were possibly not seriously concerned about the solvency of the Polish government. The potential of the economy to generate high income in the long-term was judged positively. However, the ability of the central government to find enough liquidity to honor its payments at times of turmoil (e.g., a delay in the payment of coupons) was seriously questioned.
The LGD increased above the 5% mark during the European sovereign debt crisis.
This might be due to a contagion effect from the eurozone sovereign debt crisis that may have led to a broad reassessment of sovereign credit risk in Europe at large. A formal analysis of this issue is left for future research. 
3.5.Correlation of PD and LGD with other measures of sovereign risk
The estimated PD and LGD values should be correlated with other measures of sovereign risk. Correlation between our time varying LGD estimates and the ratio of Polish public debt to GDP is 0.74 (cf., Figure 8 ). This suggests that investors take into account the level of debt when they assess potential losses caused by some sovereign debt crisis. In turn, the PD values from the most general TVLGD model had a small negative correlation with the public debt ratio (e.g., -0.10 for the PD values with a one-year maturity and -0.19 for the PD values with a 5-year maturity). However, the PD values from the CONSTLGD model have a positive correlation of 0.53 with the debt ratio, which indicates that changes in the PD assume the effect of debt on CDS spreads when the LGD is fixed.
Since we aim to verify the usefulness of our PD values as measures of sovereign risk, we also compare our estimates of PD with the PD values derived from the pricing model of ECB Working Paper 1924, June 2016 sovereign risk presented by Konopczak (2014) . 3 This author has estimated a structural model employing detailed data on the term structure of Polish sovereign debt and has used the Black-Scholes formula to derive the PD at the horizon equal to the average residual maturity of Polish debt. The average maturity of debt denominated in foreign currencies has slightly exceeded five years in this sample. Therefore, we have fitted our model-implied PD values for the five-year CDS contracts to the estimate of PD values in Konopczak (2014) . We observe the best match between the PD values when our estimated PD values come from the CON- LGD and CDS spreads for the various maturities of CDS contracts (we focus on the TVLGD model here). We find that the correlations between PD values and the CDS spreads are not very high and are heavily dependent on the maturity of the sovereign CDS. Short-term contracts are much more closely linked to the model-implied PD values than longer-term contracts. For higher maturities, the LGD values are more strongly correlated with the spreads than with the PD values. This finding is related to the high PD values observed for long-term CDS contracts in Figure 10 . When the PD values are close to one, the LGD values affect CDS 3 Michał Konopczak kindly provided data on the PD values estimated with his pricing model. spreads much more than the PD values do. In contrast, the CONSTLGD and FIXEDLGD models generate PD values that are strongly correlated with the CDS spreads (cf., Figure 11 ).
[Insert Figure 10 here] [Insert Figure 11 here]
Conclusions
We have estimated the reduced-form model to price sovereign CDS contracts for Polish debt and have achieved a superior fit between the model and the data. Our approach has enabled us to identify the PD values and expected LGD values, with both measures observed at different periods and with various expectation horizons. We have found that the
LGD has varied at very low levels, around 5%, and the two-year PD has changed from 20% in the calm period between 2004 and 2007 to levels above 80% in the early 2009 (i.e., the most dramatic time of the crisis in Poland). The probability of a crisis decreased to initial levels in subsequent periods. We interpret these results as evidence that the most likely scenario of a sovereign credit event in Poland would be associated with some temporary liquidity problems (e.g., a delay in a coupon payment) rather than a full-blown sovereign default with a major debt restructuring. In general, this research has helped us to better understand the role of the time varying expected losses in the pricing of sovereign risk.
We have confirmed the robustness of our results by comparing estimated PD and LGD values with the level of Polish sovereign debt and another measure of sovereign risk derived from an alternative model with stronger links to economic fundamentals. The results suggest that market expectations closely follow the developments of the macroeconomic situation in Poland. Interestingly enough, the sovereign debt affects the expected LGD more strongly than the expected PD.
We have also found that the market CDS spreads in Poland are good approximations for model-implied PD values for short-term expectation horizons. However, they are poor approximations for long-term expectations. This finding may be an effect of large uncertainty of market participants regarding sovereign default risk in a distant future. In general, early warning models to predict financial crises are most effective in the short-term horizon of up to 24 months.
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Our modeling framework has several potential applications. Monetary and fiscal authorities may use our model to learn how markets assess the risk of a crisis. Financial market participants may use the model to price debt instruments in their portfolios. Sovereign risk also plays an important role as a factor in explaining changes to the price of locally traded assets. Hence, the PD and the expected LGD may be key elements in models explaining asset prices in particular markets.
The empirical analysis is nonetheless subject to caveats as highlighted in the main text. 
Figure 11: Correlations between CDS premia and probability of default values in the CONSTLGD and FIXEDLGD models.
Note: The x-axis presents years to maturity and the y-axis presents the value of the correlation coefficient 
